By: Araba Annan
The Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF) was established with a clear and ambitious mandate: to maximise the value of Ghana’s mineral revenues, invest them prudently, and secure long-term benefits for both present and future generations.
The Fund is governed by the Minerals Income Investment Fund Act, 2018 (Act 978), as amended, with Section 2 outlining its core objectives. These include principles of sovereign wealth fund management such as value maximisation, transparency, sustainability, and protection against revenue volatility. While these provisions reflect globally recognised best practices in sovereign wealth governance, a critical question remains: whether implementation has effectively aligned with legislative intent and policy objectives.
Since its inception in 2018, there is limited evidence to conclusively demonstrate that MIIF has fully delivered on its core objects and purpose. While the Fund has undertaken some investment activities, concerns persist about whether these align with the long-term, intergenerational savings and wealth accumulation goals that define sovereign wealth funds. A key feature of such funds is disciplined saving and reinvestment of resource revenues over time. In Ghana’s case, this objective appears constrained by structural and policy choices that prioritise immediate fiscal needs over long-term capital growth.
The situation has become even more pronounced following the 2025 amendment, which effectively leaves MIIF with only 2 percent of mineral revenues, while 98 percent is directed to the Minister of Finance. This shift significantly undermines the Fund’s capacity to operate as intended. With such a limited share of revenues, MIIF’s ability to build a robust investment portfolio, generate meaningful returns, and serve as a buffer against commodity price volatility is severely restricted. In practical terms, it weakens the Fund’s identity as a sovereign wealth fund and repositions it closer to a marginal investment vehicle. Equally concerning is the absence of clear, detailed implementation guidelines governing how MIIF funds are managed, allocated, and monitored. Unlike the Petroleum Revenue Management framework or even the Mineral Development Fund, which provide more structured rules on allocation and utilisation, MIIF lacks comparable clarity and enforceable safeguards. This creates uncertainty around investment decision-making, revenue flows, and accountability mechanisms. (GHEITI,2023 report)
Furthermore, transparency and reporting remain critical gaps. For an institution entrusted with managing non-renewable resource wealth, there must be strong provisions for public disclosure, performance tracking, and independent oversight. Without these, it becomes difficult to assess whether investments are yielding optimal returns or serving the broader national interest.
Taken together, these issues suggest a misalignment between the original intent of MIIF and its current operation. The Fund was designed to function as a long-term savings and investment vehicle for Ghana’s mineral wealth, yet current practices, particularly the drastic reduction in its revenue base and the lack of robust governance frameworks limit its effectiveness in fulfilling that role.
For MIIF to truly serve its purpose, reforms are necessary. These would include restoring a meaningful share of mineral revenues to the Fund, establishing clear and transparent investment and withdrawal guidelines, strengthening oversight mechanisms, and aligning its operations with international best practices for sovereign wealth funds. Without such measures, it will remain difficult to argue that MIIF, in its current form, is being carried out in line with its founding objectives.
To move toward best practices in sovereign wealth fund management, it is important for Ghana to draw lessons from countries with well-established and effective systems. This necessitates a comparative analysis of Ghana, Botswana, and Norway. The differences between Botswana’s Pula Fund, Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), and Ghana’s Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF) are evident. Not in their stated intent, but in their discipline, institutional structure, and consistency of implementation.
While all three countries are resource-rich and established funds for long-term benefit, Botswana and Norway have been more consistent in aligning policy with practice through clear rules and strong institutions. In contrast, Ghana’s MIIF reflects gaps in implementation, particularly in savings discipline and policy consistency.
THE PULA FUND OF BOTSWANA
The Pula Fund is Botswana’s sovereign wealth fund, established in 1994 to invest surplus revenues from diamond exports into long-term foreign assets. Managed by the Bank of Botswana, it serves as a stabilisation and savings mechanism, often described as a “rainy day” fund, aimed at insulating the economy from commodity price volatility while preserving wealth for future generations. Although the Pula Fund faces challenges such as exposure to global market fluctuations and debates around transparency and domestic investment priorities, it has nonetheless contributed significantly to macroeconomic stability and prudent mineral revenue management in Botswana. Its integration within a broader fiscal framework, including disciplined budgetary rules, has helped the country avoid the resource curse commonly observed in other resource-rich economies. As a result, Botswana’s model presents a compelling case for study, particularly for countries like Ghana seeking to strengthen their sovereign wealth and mineral revenue governance systems. The Pula Fund’s long-term, rules-based, and forward-looking approach offers important lessons for enhancing transparency, sustainability, and intergenerational equity in extractive resource management. (AfDB,2016)
IDENTIFIED KEY STRENGTH OF BOTSWANA AND NORWAY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND AS AGAINST GHANA’S MIIF
1. Clarity of Purpose and Policy Discipline
Botswana and Norway demonstrate strong clarity of purpose in managing natural resource revenues, anchored in well-defined fiscal rules. Botswana’s Sustainable Budget Index (SBI) ensures that recurrent expenditure is financed from non-mineral revenues, preserving mineral income for investment and long-term savings (AFDB, 2016).
Similarly, Norway’s fiscal rule allows the government to spend only the expected real return (about 3%) of its sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), thereby protecting the principal and insulating the economy from oil price volatility (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2023).
In contrast, Ghana’s Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF) was designed with similar intentions but lacks consistent policy discipline. The significant reduction in allocations where only about 2% of mineral revenues flow into MIIF reflects increasing reliance on resource revenues for short-term fiscal needs, undermining the Fund’s original long-term savings objective (GHEITI, 2023).
2. Culture of Savings and Revenue Allocation
Norway and Botswana both exhibit strong savings cultures. Norway channels almost all net petroleum revenues into the GPFG, investing them globally to build a diversified financial asset base (World Bank, 2021; Norges Bank, 2023). Botswana similarly saves and invests a substantial share of its diamond revenues through the Pula Fund, supporting macroeconomic stability and long-term wealth accumulation (Bank of Botswana, 2023; World Bank, 2021).
Ghana, however, allocates the overwhelming majority of mineral revenues—approximately 98% to the consolidated fund, leaving only a marginal share of 2% for MIIF. This severely constrains the country’s ability to build a robust savings buffer and limits the transformative potential of its natural resource wealth. (GHEITI, 2023; Ministry of Finance, 2024)
3. Governance or Institutional Capacity and Effectiveness
Both Norway and Botswana benefit from strong institutional arrangements. Norway’s GPFG is managed by Norges Bank Investment Management under a clear mandate from the Ministry of Finance, with defined roles for Parliament, the Ministry, and the central bank (OECD, 2021; Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2023).
Botswana’s Pula Fund is managed by the Bank of Botswana, ensuring professional oversight, legal integrity, and alignment with national fiscal policy (Bank of Botswana, 2023).
Ghana’s MIIF operates as a corporate entity with investment authority, which in theory provides flexibility. However, in practice, it lacks clearly enforced rules on savings thresholds, allocation formulas, and withdrawal conditions. This creates room for discretion and weakens institutional accountability.
4. Transparency, Accountability, and Policy Consistency
Norway sets the global standard for transparency, with comprehensive disclosure of investments, regular reporting, and strong ethical guidelines governing the Fund (Norges Bank, 2023; OECD, 2021). Botswana, while less expansive in disclosure, has maintained relatively consistent fiscal policies and a stable regulatory environment, reinforcing investor confidence (World Bank, 2021).
Ghana has made important strides in promoting transparency in the extractive sector through the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI), particularly by improving revenue disclosure and public reporting. However, the Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF) continues to face concerns regarding transparency, reporting clarity, and its measurable developmental impact, alongside broader issues of policy inconsistency.
Notably, there is no consistent and comprehensive public reporting on the utilisation and performance of funds managed under MIIF, which limits public scrutiny and accountability (GHEITI, 2023). This lack of regular, accessible reporting undermines confidence in the Fund’s ability to deliver on its mandate of maximising mineral revenue for national development and intergenerational equity.
5. Intergenerational Focus
A defining strength of both Norway and Botswana is their commitment to intergenerational equity. Norway preserves its petroleum wealth by investing globally and spending only returns, ensuring that future generations benefit equally (World Bank, 2021; IMF, 2022). Botswana has similarly converted diamond wealth into long-term assets, including foreign reserves and infrastructure, while maintaining savings (World Bank, 2021).
Ghana’s Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF), however, continues to face challenges in effectively fulfilling its intended role as a sovereign wealth fund. Limited and inconsistent inflows, coupled with the absence of a clearly defined and enforceable savings rule, undermine its capacity to function as a true intergenerational fund (IMF, 2023). Furthermore, the Fund lacks a comprehensive and transparent investment framework that clearly prioritises long-term, intergenerational objectives. As it currently stands, this weak strategic orientation constrains MIIF’s ability to fully achieve its mandate of preserving and growing mineral wealth for future generations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Develop a Clear, Transparent, and Consistent Policy Framework
A comprehensive and coherent policy framework should be established to guide the implementation of the MIIF. This framework must prioritise transparency, consistency, and accountability in decision-making and operations. - Prioritise Long-Term Savings and Wealth Accumulation
MIIF should be strategically aligned with long-term savings objectives to ensure that mineral revenues contribute to sustainable wealth accumulation, rather than short-term expenditure. - Promote Intergenerational Equity
MIIF should institutionalise mechanisms for intergenerational savings to ensure that future generations benefit from Ghana’s mineral wealth. This will help the Fund achieve its core objective of long-term national prosperity. - Strengthen Governance of Mineral Revenue Withdrawals
As proposed by GHEITI in its 2023 report, there should be a framework for the withdrawal and utilisation of the 78% from the Mineral Income Holding Account. This should be guided by clear, legally backed governance provisions, similar to the framework governing the Ghana Petroleum Funds. This will enhance transparency, accountability, and fiscal discipline. - Broad-Based Consultation on MIIF and Mineral Revenue Management
The Government should organise a broad-based national dialogue or consultative forum on the MIIF Act and the overall management of mineral revenues. This process should aim to build consensus and adopt a widely accepted framework for effective and sustainable mineral revenue governance.
CONCLUSION
Norway and Botswana demonstrate that transforming natural resource wealth into sustainable development outcomes requires clear fiscal rules, disciplined savings, strong institutions, and policy consistency. Both countries treat resource revenues as long-term national assets to be preserved and invested. Ghana, under the current MIIF framework, appears to be prioritizing immediate fiscal demands over long-term wealth accumulation. Without stronger policy discipline, improved governance, and a renewed commitment to savings, the country risks missing the opportunity to convert its mineral wealth into lasting prosperity. This calls for a review and a more deliberate approach to ensure the intent, purpose and objectives of the fund is fully achieved.
REFERENCES:
Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI). (2023). GHEITI report on the mining sector. Government of Ghana.
African Development Bank. (2016). Botswana economic outlook. https://www.afdb.org
Bank of Botswana. (2023). Annual report 2023. https://www.bankofbotswana.bw
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). (2023). Ghana EITI report 2023. https://eiti.org
International Monetary Fund. (2022). Norway: Staff report for the Article IV consultation. https://www.imf.org
International Monetary Fund. (2023). Ghana: Staff report for the Article IV consultation. https://www.imf.org
Ministry of Finance, Ghana. (2024). Budget statement and economic policy. Government of Ghana.
Norges Bank Investment Management. (2023). Government Pension Fund Global annual report 2023. https://www.nbim.no
Norwegian Ministry of Finance. (2023). The management of the Government Pension Fund. https://www.regjeringen.no
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2021). Sovereign wealth funds and long-term investment. https://www.oecd.org
Republic of Ghana. (2006). Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703).
Republic of Ghana. (2015). Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 900).
Republic of Ghana. (2018). Minerals Income Investment Fund Act, 2018 (Act 978).
World Bank. (2021). The changing wealth of nations 2021: Managing assets for the future. https://www.worldbank.org
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Araba Annan is a legal practitioner and gender advocate with expertise in law, gender equality, and extractive sector governance. She has worked on issues related to natural resource governance, with a particular focus on strengthening gender-responsive policies, human rights compliance, and environmental accountability within mining communities in Ghana.
Her work includes research and policy engagement on inclusive resource governance, transparency in mineral revenue management, and the promotion of equitable participation of women in decision-making processes within the extractive sector.
She has contributed to multi-stakeholder discussions aimed at improving governance frameworks and aligning national practices with international human rights and sustainable development standards.